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Abstract
The objective of this paper is to inform the debate on how ef®ciency targets for Network
Rail (formerly Railtrack) should be set during the 2002/03 Interim Review and beyond.
Given the problems experienced during the 2000 Periodic Review, which focused on
external benchmarks, we propose an internal benchmarking approach, drawing on data for
seven geographical zones within Railtrack. Our approach mirrors the yardstick
competition method used in other UK regulated industries. Two ef®ciency measurement
techniques are applied to this data. Our results suggest that Railtrack (as a whole) delivered
substantial real unit cost reductions in the early years after privatisation, although these
savings were largely offset by the post-Hat®eld cost increases. However, looking forward,
zonal ef®ciency differences suggest that the company could make signi®cant savings in
future years by applying best practice consistently across the network.
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1. Introduction
The 2000 Periodic Review of Railtrack’s1 access charges saw considerable
debate about the scope for the company to deliver ef®ciency savings
during the second regulatory control period.2 To inform the debate,
comparisons were made with a number of external benchmarks (interna-
tional railway companies and other UK privatised industries). However,
none of these comparisons proved completely satisfactory. NERA (2000)
found a lack of international railway (infrastructure) data to make
meaningful comparisons with Railtrack. At the same time, the experience
of privatised industries in the UK produced a wide range of potential
ef®ciency targets for the company, and there was disagreement over which
industry was most comparable with the railways.
The two years following the Periodic Review conclusions (October
2000) have seen considerable change in the industry. Just as the Periodic
Review conclusions were being ®nalised, a train derailment at Hat®eld,3
resulting from defective track, set off a chain of events which resulted in
Railtrack being placed into administration roughly one year later (October
2001). The derailment heightened concerns over the condition of Britain’s
rail infrastructure, and Railtrack management responded by imposing
speed restrictions across the network. Maintenance and renewal activity
was also stepped up, leading to a sharp increase in costs.
The Hat®eld accident precipitated a major ®nancial crisis at Railtrack.
In addition to higher maintenance and renewal costs, in 2000/01 Railtrack
also had to pay more than £500m in compensation to train operators
4
for
the resulting disruption to the network (caused by speed restrictions and
unplanned maintenance and renewal work). At the same time, the
company was facing large cost overruns on the West Coast Mainline
upgrade project,
5
where the cost of the work had grown from an initial
estimate of £2.3 billion in 1996, to £5.8 billion in 2000 (in 1998/99 prices).6
In October 2002, a new company, Network Rail, emerged as the owner
and operator of Britain’s rail network, having agreed to purchase Railtrack
PLC (in administration) from the parent company.
7
Network Rail is a
1
Britain’s rail infrastructure provider (April 1994 to October 2002). See Section 2.
2
Covering the period 2001/02 to 2005/06.
3In October 2000.
4
Under Schedule 4 (possessions regime) and Schedule 8 (performance regime) of the track access
agreements.
5
The renewal and enhancement of Britain’s West Coast Main Line (linking London and Glasgow).
6Source: Of®ce of Rail Regulator, 2000. Higher estimates have been made since 2000. See Pollitt and
Smith (2002) for further analysis of the reasons for the cost overrun.
7
In administration from October 2001. Railtrack Group PLC was the parent company.
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company limited by guarantee, owned by members, rather than share-
holders. However, despite the change in ownership structure, the question
of ef®ciency remains of central importance in the regulation of the new
Figure 1
Map of Zone Areas (1995/96 to 2001/02)
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company. In September 2002, the Of®ce of the Rail Regulator (ORR)
announced an (interim) review of Network Rail’s access charges8 (to be
completed by December 2003); and stated the need, during that review, to
consider the scope for realistic but challenging ef®ciency improvements.
The objective of this paper is to inform the debate on how ef®ciency
targets for Network Rail should be set at the 2002/03 Interim Review of
the company’s access charges, and beyond. Given the problems
experienced during the 2000 Periodic Review, which focused on external
benchmarks, we propose an internal benchmarking approach, drawing on
data for seven geographical zones (see Figure 1) within Railtrack (over the
period 1995/96 to 2001/02). Our approach mirrors the yardstick
competition method used in other UK regulated industries.9 Of course,
such analysis does not address the wider question of the company’s
ef®ciency relative to international or other external comparators.
However, it does indicate the potential for Network Rail to reduce costs
by applying (its own) best practice consistently across the network.
The period of our analysis, 1995/96 to 2001/02, captures the initial
ef®ciency gains achieved after privatisation (see Pollitt and Smith, 2002);
the sharp increase in costs between 1999/00 and 2001/02; and the
deterioration and subsequent recovery of some of the output and quality
measures since the Hat®eld accident. The analysis predates the acquisition
of Railtrack PLC by Network Rail, but is intended to illustrate the
possibilities for zonal yardstick comparisons going forward.10The paper is
arranged in six sections. Section 2 provides some background to Railtrack’s
organisation structure, and the ef®ciency debate that took place during the
2000 Periodic Review. Section 3 details the methodology. Section 4
describes the data and model speci®cations used in the empirical analysis.
Section 5 presents the results and Section 6 offers some conclusions.
2. Background
2.1. The structure of Railtrack
The separation of infrastructure management from train operation was
one of the most signi®cant, and controversial, elements of Britain’s rail
privatisation programme. In 1994, the ®xed railway infrastructure assets
were transferred to a new company, Railtrack, separate from British Rail
8This announcement was made on September 25, a few days before Network Rail actually took over
from Railtrack. See ORR (September 2002).
9See Section 2.2 below. See also Shleifer, 1985.
10
Or, more generally, comparisons at business unit level (since it is possible that Network Rail may
change the organisational structure).
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(BR), but still wholly-owned by Government. The company was sold by
public offer in 1996. Contracts were put in place between Railtrack and
BR (and later the privatised passenger and freight operators), governing
the charges for (and general terms of) access to the rail infrastructure.
At the same time, it was also decided that the infrastructure maintenance
and renewal activities, previously undertaken by BR, would not be
transferred to Railtrack; instead, these activities were reorganised into
separate infrastructure maintenance companies (IMCs) and track renewal
companies (TRCs), and privatised by trade sale. These companies provided
maintenance and renewal services to Railtrack based on medium term
contracts. The initial maintenance contracts were output-based, and were
set to decline each year by RPI-3%; these contracts have recently been re-
negotiated (a process that was largely completed by the end of 2002). Track
renewals were to be negotiated on a case-by-case basis.11
At privatisation (1996) the organisation structure of Railtrack was
based around seven12 geographical zones (see Figure 1), with a corporate
centre. This structure has been continued under Network Rail. The
functions of the corporate centre include strategy, ®nancial control, safety
assurance, procurement, and R&D. The zones are responsible for
managing the maintenance/renewal contracts within their area, subject
to direction from the centre.13 Expenditure plans are formulated at the
zonal level, although ®nancial and other targets are determined centrally.
2.2. Previous studies of Railtrack’s ef®ciency
As a monopoly provider of rail infrastructure, it was clear from the outset
that Railtrack’s charges (to train operators) for access to the network
would need to be regulated. The original level of ``access charges’’ was
determined by the Department of Transport. These charges were later
reduced by the ORR, to re¯ect the expectation that Railtrack would be
able to achieve signi®cant ef®ciency savings over the ®rst regulatory
control period (covering the period 1995/96 to 2000/01). Railtrack
therefore became subject to the ``RPI-X’’ incentive-regulation used for
other privatised utilities.
11
However, Railtrack retained the option to (periodically) tender for renewals in order to test the
market.
12On formation, in 1994, the company was arranged into ten zones. The ten zones included (in addition
to the seven shown in Figure 1): West Coast, East Coast, and South West. West Coast was divided
into Scotland, Midlands, and North West zone. East Coast was divided into LNE and Scotland
zones. South West was combined with Southern zone. This process started on 26 June 1995, when
the number of zones was reduced to eight. See Railtrack Annual Report 1994/95. Railtrack data on a
seven-zonal basis are available from 1995/96 (®nancial year) onwards.
13
Each maintenance contract area was contained within the boundary of a single zone.
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In December 1997 the ORR started consultation on the appropriate
level of ef®ciency targets for the company over the second control period
(covering the period 2001/02 to 2005/06). The ORR’s assessment of the
scope for future ef®ciencies was based on evidence from a range of
different sources
14
and was supported by four consultant reports: Booz-
Allen and Hamilton (1999 and 2000); NERA (2000); Europe Economics
(2000); and Horton 4 Consulting (2000); described in turn below. It should
be noted that the academic literature provided little evidence on this
question, since most studies had focused on comparing the ef®ciency of
railway systems, rather than rail infrastructure provision. We have
identi®ed only one academic study which considered rail infrastructure
ef®ciency (Chapin and Schmidt, 1999), although their paper is concerned
with the impact of mergers on ef®ciency (US Class I railroads), rather than
on international comparison.
Booz-Allen and Hamilton (1999; 2000) adopted a ``bottom-up’’
approach to assessing the potential for ef®ciency gains. They reviewed
each of Railtrack’s asset areas and functions, and identi®ed speci®c
ef®ciency opportunities in each area. At the overall level, Booz-Allen and
Hamiliton’s work suggested ef®ciency targets of approximately 4 per cent
per annum. However, the ORR noted that this approach Ð by de®nition
Ð did not take account of the potential for savings from (as yet)
unspeci®ed ef®ciency initiatives.
The remaining three consultant reports were based on ``top-down’’
methodologies. NERA (2000) examined the international evidence on rail
infrastructure costs. They compared productivity levels across a number of
countries (US, Canada, Japan, Australia, and Europe), and also analysed
productivity trends (US Class I railroads). In respect of productivity levels,
NERA found that there was insuf®cient evidence in the public domain to
draw meaningful conclusions. However, their trend analysis revealed that
the US Class I railroads had achieved annual productivity growth
(infrastructure only) of between 3.3 and 3.9 per cent over the period 1986
to 1998. NERA argued that this benchmark provided a realistic long-run
target for Railtrack, though recognised that it did not say anything about
the scope for Railtrack to achieve the (expected) ``catch-up’’
15
savings
resulting from privatisation.
14
This assessment is set out in ORR (October 2000), ORR (July 2000), and ORR (December 1999).
15That is, catch-up to private sector best practice, following the change from public to private
ownership. NERA acknowledged that their US calculations excluded the sharp improvements in
productivity that occurred immediately after deregulation in 1980. NERA also recognised the
problems of comparing a predominantly passenger railway (Britain) with a freight dominated
railway (US).
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NERA also reviewed a study by LEK (2000), prepared for English,
Welsh, and Scottish Railways, but largely dismissed the LEK ®ndings. The
LEK study (of US Class I railroads) reported rail infrastructure
productivity gains of 6.7 per cent per annum between 1980 and 1998,
although NERA argued that the study failed to adjust for scale and
density effects. LEK also showed Railtrack’s freight access charges to be
considerably higher than the infrastructure costs of the largest ®ve US
Class I railroads; however, this ®nding was based on comparing Railtrack
prices with US costs, and also focused on a single (partial) productivity
measure.
Europe Economics (1999) argued that the experience of other UK
privatised network businesses offered the best means of assessing the scope
for Railtrack ef®ciency improvements (the industries chosen were water,
sewerage, electricity transmission and distribution, and gas transporta-
tion). In particular, each of these industries had, like Railtrack, been
transferred from public to private ownership, and therefore provided
useful evidence concerning the scope for ``catch-up’’ savings following
privatisation. Based on this evidence, Europe Economics suggested that
Railtrack’s ef®ciency target should be in the region of 3 to 5 per cent per
annum (in real terms). Horton 4 Consulting (2000) supported the
conclusions of the Europe Economics report, although they did not
present any new evidence.16
In the event, Railtrack’s ef®ciency target was eventually set at 3.6 per
cent per annum,17 close to the lower end of the range suggested by Europe
Economics. Railtrack commissioned its own consultants (OXERA, 2000),
who argued for a target closer to 2 per cent per annum. In essence, the
dispute centred on the comparability of the benchmark information: for
example, in terms of the scope for technical change; the extent of capital
substitution; differences in volume growth and scale effects; and real wage
in¯ation differentials.
18
Given the problems experienced during the 2000 Periodic Review,
which focused on external benchmarks, the objective of this paper is to
explore the use of internal (zonal) benchmarking to inform the debate on
future ef®ciency targets for Network Rail. Compared to external
comparisons, our approach has a number of advantages. First of all, the
data is consistent across zones, and our analysis does not therefore suffer
16See ORR (July 2000) page 48.
17
See ORR (October 2000), page 36. This is the underlying ef®ciency improvement on controllable
costs, and is based on a simple average.
18
But note that the ORR adjusted Railtrack’s ef®ciency targets to take account of this last factor in the
®nal conclusions.
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from the problems often experienced in international studies. Further-
more, differences in scale, technology, or other environmental factors,
which usually affect ef®ciency comparisons, are likely to be relatively
small. Finally, we expect the analysis of comparable, internal business
units to provide clearer guidance on how savings can be achieved in
practice.
The internal benchmarking approach, based on sub-company data,
also has strong precedents. In the water sector, OFWAT has used sub-
company regional data in its econometric analysis for the sewerage
business (in order to increase the number of observations; see OFWAT,
April 1998). Furthermore, the Competition Commission has recently
suggested that OFWAT consider extending this approach to cover the
water business during the 2004 periodic review.
19
OFGEM has also
recently announced proposals for separate price controls for each of the
eight regional gas distribution areas (see OFGEM, June 2003). In the
academic literature, Burns and Weyman-Jones (1998) used sub-company
data Ð from twelve British Gas regions Ð to estimate a cost function for
the gas supply business (1990/91 to 1992/93).
Of course, internal benchmarking does not address the wider question
of a regulated company’s ef®ciency position, relative to international or
other external comparators. As a result, economic regulators in the UK
have tended to use a range of internal and external comparisons to inform
their ef®ciency determinations. In the present context we consider that the
internal (zonal) benchmarking approach offers a useful additional
methodology for the ORR in determining ef®ciency targets for Network
Rail going forward. In this regard, we note that the ORR and Network
Rail have commissioned an additional zonal benchmarking study as part
of the current interim review of Network Rail’s ®nances (see ORR,
September 2002), building on the analysis outlined here in Sections 3 to 6
below.
3. Methodology
In this paper we apply two parametric techniques to assess the relative
ef®ciency of Railtrack’s zones over the period 1995/96 to 2001/02:
corrected ordinary least squares (COLS); and stochastic frontier analysis
19
In its report on the proposed acquisition of First Aqua (JVCo) Limited by Vivendi Water UK PLC
(2002).
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(SFA). Parametric ef®ciency measurement techniques have been widely
applied to the study of productivity and ef®ciency measurement in the
railway industry (see Affuso, Angeriz and Pollitt, 2002, for a review of this
literature). We note that the use of more than one approach (COLS and
SFA) enables the results of alternative methodologies to be compared.
This section brie¯y describes the methodologies used in the subsequent
analysis. The model speci®cations used in our empirical analysis are
described in Section 4 below.
In conducting parametric ef®ciency analysis there is a choice to be
made regarding the function (or frontier) to be estimated. We follow Coelli
and Perelman (1999) and estimate an input distance function (using both
the COLS and SFA techniques). Coelli and Perelman ®nd that distance
function estimation offers a convenient way of handling multiple inputs
and outputs without the need to impose restrictive behavioural assump-
tions. They applied this method to the study of seventeen European
railways over the period 1988±1993. We consider that this approach is
applicable to the question under analysis here (as explained in Section 4.2
below). Coelli and Perelman (1999) de®ne the (translog) input distance
function for M outputs and K inputs as:20
ln DIi D a0 C
XM
mD1
am ln ymiC1=2
XM
mD1
XM
nD1
amn ln ymi ln yniC
XK
kD1
bk ln xki
C 1=2
XK
kD1
XK
lD1
bkl ln xki ln xli C
XK
kD1
XM
mD1
dkm ln xki ln ymi
i D 1; 2; . . . N;
(1)
where i denotes the ith ®rm in the sample, the yi and xi are the M outputs
and K inputs respectively, DIi represents the input distance function, and
a; b; and d are parameters to be estimated. Coelli and Perelman impose
homogeneity of degree one in inputs by dividing through by one of the
inputs (arbitrarily chosen). After this transformation, equation (1)
becomes:
ln(DIi=xKi) D TL(xi=xKi; yi; a; b; d); i D 1; 2; . . . n; (2)
where TL represents the translog function. Equation (2) can be re-
arranged to give:
¡ ln(xKi) D TL(xi=xKi; yi; a; b; d) ¡ ln(DIi); i D 1; 2; . . . n: (3)
20
See Coelli and Perelman (1999), page 329.
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Equation (3) now shows the log of the Kth input as a function of the
outputs, and the ratios of the other inputs (to the Kth input). The ln(DIi)
term is interpreted as the one-sided inef®ciency term.
Equation (3) may be estimated using COLS or, with some alteration,
SFA (see below). The COLS method, developed by Greene (1980)
21
proceeds by estimating equation (3) using OLS, and then adjusting the
intercept by adding the largest positive residual. Ef®ciency scores are then
calculated as the exponential of the adjusted residuals. The COLS method
makes no allowance for noise, and assumes that all deviations from the
frontier result from inef®ciency (deterministic model). To overcome this
problem, we also apply the SFA technique, developed (independently) by
Aigner, Lovell, and Schmidt (1977) and Meeusen and van Den Broeck
(1977), to our data set. The stochastic frontier method adds an additional
random error (vi) to the deterministic frontier model in equation (3), and
can be written as:
¡ ln(xKi) D TL(xi=xKi; yia; b; d) C vi ¡ ui; i D 1; 2; . . . N; (4)
where the vi term represents random noise, and is assumed to be
identically and independently distributed as N(0; s2v); the notation ln(DIi)
is changed to ui; where the ui term re¯ects inef®ciency, and is therefore
constrained to be non-negative. The ui is assumed to be distributed
independently of vi and the regressors, and is usually assumed to be drawn
from a N(0; s2u) half-normal distribution.
The stochastic frontier approach applies maximum likelihood estima-
tion to equation (4), and the ef®ciency scores are then calculated from the
residuals using the procedure developed by Jondrow, Lovell, Materov,
and Schmidt (1982). The SFA technique has now been automated on
many statistical packages, including FRONTIER and LIMDEP (both
used in our analysis). The ordinary least squares regressions were carried
out using the statistical package MICROFIT. Our parametric model
speci®cations are described in Section 4.2 below.
4. Data and Model Speci®cations
This section describes our data set, as well as the model speci®cations used
in the analysis presented in Section 5.
21
Building on the work of Aigner and Chu (1968), Afriat (1972), and Richmond (1974).
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4.1. Data description
The data set used in this study covers seven zones over the period 1995/96
to 2001/02, and was collected through ®eldwork at Railtrack between
February and August 2002. The data is shown in Table 1 (period
averages), and includes:
. maintenance costs (MAIN);
. total costs (TOTC), which is the sum of maintenance and track renewal
costs (REN);
. passenger train miles (PTM);
. passenger tonne miles (PTON);
. freight gross tonne miles (FTON);
. track miles (TRAC);
. Railtrack-caused delays (DELS); and
. broken rails (BRLS).
The cost variables, maintenance (MAIN) and track renewal costs
(REN), accounted for £1.7bn, or roughly 45 per cent of Railtrack’s total
cash expenditure in 2001/02.22 The variables PTM, PTON, FTON, and
TRAC are all measures of volume and are commonly used in railway
ef®ciency and productivity studies (see Section 4.2 below). The DELS
variable can be viewed as a measure of asset performance, while the
inclusion of BRLS in the data set provides a measure of asset condition
Table 1
Inputs and Outputs (averages 1995/96 to 2001/02)
Inputs (costs) Inputs (quality) Outputs
2000/01
£m
¤
MAIN
£m
REN
£m
TOTC
£m
DELS
000 min
BRLS
Number
PTM
Million
PTON
Million
FTON
Million
TRAC
Miles
East Anglia 76.2 38.4 114.6 882 68 24.5 5,093 1,155 1,414
Great Western 108.3 57.3 165.6 1,671 90 32.0 6,903 4,452 3,136
LNE 114.4 63.4 177.7 1,958 213 37.3 8,114 6,169 3,448
Midlands 137.4 126.0 263.4 2,599 132 43.5 9,662 5,154 3,096
North West 94.7 50.2 144.9 1,425 95 29.0 4,115 2,564 2,638
Scotland 83.6 39.6 123.2 794 62 24.6 4,269 2,288 2,541
Southern 149.7 57.2 206.8 2,113 104 64.4 15,100 1,617 3,017
Network 764.3 432.1 1,196.4 11,442 763 255.1 53,255 23,398 19,290
¤
Where monetary values are used.
22De®ned as: (maintenance and track renewal expenditure) divided by (operating costs less asset
maintenance plan (AMP) charge and depreciation plus total renewal expenditure). The remaining 55
per cent comprises non-track renewal costs, signalling operations, traction costs and overheads.
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(and, in turn, safety). Further details about the data and sources are
provided in Appendix 1.
It should be noted that the cost measures (MAIN, REN, and TOTC) are
based largely on payments made by Railtrack to its contractors. It is
therefore possible that contract payments might have diverged from
underlying costs over the period. In particular, in the early years after
privatisation, the contractors might have cut costs faster than the cost
reductions implied by the contract prices. On the other hand, Railtrack’s
suppliers might not have been fully compensated for increased costs
resulting from traf®c growth following privatisation. In respect of the latter
point, however, we note that there have been some (con®dential) volume-
related payments made to contractors; and the data shows considerable
variation in contract cost trends across zones in the early years.
Of course, the problem raised by the use of contractors is shared with
comparative benchmarking studies conducted in other UK regulated
sectors Ð for example, the water and sewerage industry, where many
activities are outsourced, or provided by another company within the same
group Ð and does not therefore invalidate our approach. Indeed, in the
case of Welsh Water (where all operations are outsourced), OFWAT has
indicated its intention to continue to benchmark the company in the same
way as the remaining companies in the sector. We further note that,
between 1999/00 and 2001/02, the majority of Railtrack’s contracts were
renegotiated (therefore realigning costs with payments); and we were not
able to ®nd any systematic relationship between contract renegotiation
and relative ef®ciency performance (see Section 5.2.3).
4.2. Model speci®cations
Before describing the model speci®cations used to measure relative
ef®ciency for Railtrack’s seven zones, we ®rst outline our treatment of
general changes in real unit costs (frontier shifts) that have occurred since
privatisation (Hat®eld and time trend effects). Note that for estimation
purposes the data is pooled, to create 49 observations (seven zones over
seven years). The sample size is therefore acceptable from an econometric
perspective and will increase, over time, as additional observations (years)
become available.
4.2.1. Modelling frontier shifts (Hat®eld and time trend effects)
As noted in Section 1, the cost of Railtrack’s maintenance and renewal
activities increased sharply following the Hat®eld accident in October 2000
(see Figure 2 below). To re¯ect this structural break in the data, we have
divided the analysis in Section 5 into two parts: (1) the period 1995/96 to
Journal of Transport Economics and Policy Volume 38, Part 2
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1999/00; and (2), the full seven±year period from 1995/96 to 2001/02. In
respect of the latter we have included a Hat®eld dummy variable in the
model speci®cations (see Table 2). For the total cost models this dummy
takes the value 0.5 in 2000/01; unity in 2001/02; and zero elsewhere (the
Hat®eld accident took place midway through the ®nancial year 2000/01).
For the maintenance cost models, the dummy variable takes the value
unity in 2001/02; and zero elsewhere (since unit maintenance costs did not
start to rise sharply until 2001/02).
We also include a time trend variable (see below) in all our models in
order to test for the existence of a general reduction in real unit costs
(across all zones) over time.
23
As our results show, real unit costs did fall
considerably in the early years after privatisation, before rising sharply in
the years following the Hat®eld accident (see Section 5). The latter effect is
captured by the Hat®eld dummy variable.
4.2.2. Parametric model speci®cations
In seeking to analyse the relative ef®ciency of Railtrack’s zones Ð and the
overall unit cost performance of the company Ð it is important to take
account of changes in quality that have occurred over the period, and
across zones. In this way, genuine ef®ciency/real unit cost improvements
may be distinguished from cost reductions achieved simply by allowing
quality measures to deteriorate. As noted in Section 4.1 our analysis
contains two quality variables: Railtrack-caused delays (DELS), which can
Table 2
Parametric Models (COLS and SFA)
Model 1 Model 2
Inputs
¤
MAIN TOTC
Input ratios DELS/MAIN DELS/TOTC
BRLS/MAIN BRLS/TOTC
Outputs
¤¤
TRAC TRAC
PTMD PTMD
FTOND FTOND
Other variables TIME TIME
DUMMY DUMMY
¤
Arbitrarily chosen as the dependent variable.
¤¤
Traf®c volume measures expressed as densities (per track mile).
23
This speci®cation achieves the best ®t with the data.
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be thought of as a measure of asset reliability; and the number of broken
rails (BRLS), which can be regarded as an indicator of asset condition.
As described in Section 3, our modelling approach follows that of
Coelli and Perelman (1999), who used distance function estimation in their
comparison of European railway systems. The speci®cations for our
(input) distance function models are shown in Table 2. We consider that
the input distance function application is appropriate in the present
context. Under this interpretation, the quality variables (delays and
broken rails) described above are treated as inputs. Railtrack zones are
then assumed to minimise inputs (costs, delays, and broken rails) for a
given level of (exogenously determined) output (track miles and traf®c
volume).24 The potential trade-off between cost and quality is therefore
explicitly recognised in the distance function speci®cation (since increased
maintenance and renewal of assets Ð which in turn leads to improved
asset performance and condition Ð involves higher cost, and vice versa).
We note that previous studies of international railway ef®ciency have been
unable to adjust for quality differences due to the lack of comparable data.
The delays and broken rail variables included in our analysis are highly
relevant quality measures that have been the subject of considerable
discussion between the ORR and Railtrack.25 Furthermore, it is clear that
management action (or inaction), combined with changes in traf®c
volumes and mix, can have a signi®cant impact on these measures within
a short period of time. For example, at the national level, the number of
broken rails fell by more than 40 per cent over just two years (1999/00 to
2001/02), following the imposition of regulatory targets and focused
management attention. At the micro-level, discussions with Railtrack
engineers suggest that increases in heavy freight traf®c on lines previously
maintained for light regional passenger traf®c (such as the Settle±Carlisle
route), can quickly translate into deteriorating asset condition. We also
note that the DELS and BRLS measures vary considerably across zones
and over time.
We therefore conclude that management is able to exert considerable
in¯uence on the DELS and BRLS variables (for a given level and mix of
traf®c), even over short time periods; and that the inclusion of these
24
Regarding the question of potential regressor endogeneity Ð caused by the inclusion of the input
ratios on the right hand side of the distance function regression equations Ð Coelli and Perelman
(1996) argue that these can be regarded as exogenous, since the distance function is de®ned for radial
reductions in all inputs, for given output levels.
25
Over the period of our analysis, the company was strongly encouraged to reduce delays through the
combined incentives of the performance regime and the additional regulatory target set by the ORR
in 1999. The Regulator also set targets for broken rails following the sharp increase in 1998/99 and
1999/00 (see ORR, 1999).
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quality variables in our zonal ef®ciency analysis is therefore valid. While
we accept that there are other factors affecting the cost/quality trade-off
Ð as measured by our analysis Ð such as asset age, and other measures of
quality (for example, track geometry), we were unable to obtain zonal data
on these factors for the full seven-year period. We return to this point in
Section 5.3.3 below.
The output variables shown in Table 2 are derived from the alternative
speci®cations used in the railway ef®ciency and productivity literature.
The majority of previous studies include measures of passenger and freight
volumes as railway outputs.
26 We use freight tonne miles (FTON) to
represent freight traf®c volumes. For passenger traf®c we have used
passenger train miles (PTM).27 In line with previous studies, the traf®c
volume variables are expressed as densities (PTMD and FTOND) and
combined with the track miles variable (TRAC) in order to distinguish
between economics of scale and density,28 while avoiding potential
multicollinearity problems.29
We estimate the models in Table 2 based on the log-linear functional
form. This decision re¯ects the degrees of freedom and multicollinearity
problems arising in the translog case, given the relatively small sample size
(35 and 49 observations for the pre- and post-Hat®eld regressions
respectively). Morrison (1999) notes the particular problems (of using
the translog) with small data sets when the number of cross-section
observations is limited, as in our case (seven zones).30Technical progress is
introduced in the form of a simple time trend (TIME D 1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7 for
the full seven-year regressions). This treatment of the time trend therefore
assumes Hicks-neutral technical change. For the full seven-year regres-
sions, a ``Hat®eld’’ dummy variable is also included. Since we are
26
See, for example, Caves, Christensen, and Swanson (1980).
27We also considered the use of passenger tonne miles (PTON) to represent passenger volumes.
However, the regression equations perform better (in terms of overall ®t and signi®cance of the
variables) when passenger train miles is used to represent passenger output. The results based on
PTON are not reported in the paper.
28See, for example, Caves, Christensen, Tretheway, and Windle (1985).
29
This may occur when TRAC, PTM, and FTON are included together as independent variables.
30
We also tested the log-linear restriction against the translog for the two models (for both the pre- and
post-Hat®eld sample). The restriction could not be rejected for the maintenance cost regressions. For
the total cost regressions the null hypothesis was rejected (in favour of the translog). However, the
total cost translog model (over seven years) produced counterintuitive output elasticities for some of
the zones in the sample. In addition, the translog produces large standard errors, and only three of
the variables (two ®rst-order terms and one second-order term) were signi®cant at the 5 per cent
level. The tests used were the F test for the OLS regressions, and the likelihood ratio test for the SFA
models (although we note that the latter is a large sample test, and may not be a good approximation
in the current case).
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estimating a distance function, the derived ef®ciency scores are technical
ef®ciency measures.31.
5. Results
This section is divided into three sub-sections. Section 5.1 shows the trends
in the input, output, and partial productivity measures (at the network
level) over the period 1995/96 to 2001/02. Section 5.2 presents the results
of our ef®ciency analysis for the period before the Hat®eld accident (1995/
96 to 1999/00). Finally, Section 5.3 looks at how the post-Hat®eld
environment has impacted on absolute unit cost levels and the relative
ef®ciency positions of the seven Railtrack zones.
5.1. Network level trend analysis
Figures 2 to 5 outline the trends in inputs, outputs and partial productivity
measures (network level) over the period 1995/96 to 2001/02.
32
The quality
Figure 2
Inputs: Maintenance and Track Renewal Costs
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These scores take account of the technical relationship between cost and quality inputs (for example,
the cost of reducing the number of broken rails). However, the scores do not consider whether a
particular zone has achieved an optimal balance between the cost and quality inputs (given the price
society may be prepared to pay, for example, to reduce the number of broken rails further). Of
course, since information is not available on input prices (in the more traditional sense, for example,
labour costs), these technical ef®ciency measures also subsume within them any differences in wage
rates across the zones.
32
Note that the track miles variable is not shown since it has remained broadly constant over the
period.
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measures are shown on a normalised basis (per train mile). Figure 2 shows
that maintenance costs have fallen steadily over the period to 2000/01.
However, in the aftermath of the Hat®eld accident, maintenance and track
renewal costs have risen sharply. Figure 3 illustrates the now familiar
growth in passenger and freight traf®c, partially halted in 2000/01, as a
result of the speed restrictions imposed post-Hat®eld.
Figure 3
Outputs: Passenger Train Miles, Passenger Tonne Miles and Freight Tonne Miles
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Figure 4
Quality (inputs): Delays and Broken Rails Per Train Mile
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Figure 4 shows the signi®cant reduction in delays achieved over the
period to 1999/00. Delays have now resumed a downward path, following
the sharp increase in 2000/01, though remain high. Figure 4 also shows
that broken rails have fallen signi®cantly over the period since
privatisation, following an initial increase during the early years prior to
1999/00. Taking account of both cost and volume changes, Figure 5 shows
that unit maintenance and total costs (per total tonne mile) fell
signi®cantly after privatisation, before rising again post-Hat®eld.
Figures 2 to 5 show a clear structural break in the data after the
Hat®eld accident in October 2000. Maintenance and renewal costs have
since increased sharply, along with Railtrack-caused delays. Passenger and
freight volume growth was also partially interrupted by the Hat®eld
accident; and broken rails fell sharply over the period 1999/00 to 2001/02
(though the fall in broken rails began one year earlier). The remainder of
the analysis in this paper is therefore split into two time periods; before
and after Hat®eld.
5.2. Ef®ciency results (pre-Hat®eld)
Below we present the results of our ef®ciency analysis covering the pre-
Hat®eld period (1995/96 to 1999/00).
5.2.1. COLS results
In Section 4.2 we identi®ed two models to be estimated, based on the
literature. The OLS estimates for these models are shown in Table 3
Figure 5
Productivity Indices: Unit Maintenance and Total Cost (per tonne mile)
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below. Owing to the relatively small sample size we report only the results
based on the log-linear functional form (see Section 4.2.2 above).
Note that in Table 3 the signs of the coef®cients have been changed
(compared to equation (3) above) for ease of interpretation, so that a
positive coef®cient indicates a positive relationship between cost and the
other variables. We note that all the coef®cients in Table 3 have the
expected sign (positive relationship between cost and outputs; negative
relationship between cost and quality; and negative relationship between
cost and time, indicating ®rm-wide unit cost reductions over time). All the
coef®cients are also statistically signi®cant (except the delays input ratio in
COLS1). These results give us con®dence in the ef®ciency rankings derived
from the (adjusted) OLS residuals, shown in Table 4.
It is perhaps surprising that the total cost models (including annual
renewal costs) are well behaved given the (potentially) lumpy nature of
track renewal activity. Our results therefore suggest that some of this
potential variation is smoothed out across the zonal route portfolios.
5.2.2. SFA results
Table 5 shows the ef®ciency scores based on the SFA technique. The one-
sided generalised likelihood ratio test shows that the average response
function is not an adequate representation of the data in this case (the test
statistics in Table 5 exceed the critical value at the 5 per cent level).
33
Table 3
OLS Input Distance Function Regressions
(log-linear; t ratios in brackets)¤
COLS1 COLS2
Input
¤¤
MAIN TOTC
Constant 2.571 (6.44) 1.028 (2.05)
TIME ¡0.079 (¡8.73) ¡0.068 (¡5.05)
TRAC 0.787 (19.41) 0.867 (15.67)
PTMD 0.692 (16.23) 0.768 (13.20)
FTOND 0.200 (5.35) 0.364 (8.13)
DELS (ratio) ¡0.053 (¡1.17) ¡0.134 (¡2.20)
BRLS (ratio) ¡0.121 (¡3.92) ¡0.217 (¡5.49)
Adjusted R
2
0.959 0.936
¤
Positive coef®cient indicates positive relationship.
¤¤
Arbitrary choice of dependent variable.
33
See Coelli, Rao, and Battese (1998), Chapter 8, for more on this test.
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Table 4
Summary of COLS ef®ciency scores¤
COLS1
(MAIN)
¤¤
COLS2
(TOTC)
¤¤
95/96 East Anglia 0.907 [4] 0.914 [3]
95/96 Great Western 0.997 [1] 0.996 [1]
95/96 London North Eastern 0.878 [7] 0.842 [6]
95/96 Midlands 0.881 [6] 0.872 [5]
95/96 North West 0.932 [3] 0.916 [2]
95/96 Scotland 0.886 [5] 0.838 [7]
95/96 Southern 0.947 [2] 0.874 [4]
Average 0.918 0.893
99/00 East Anglia 0.959 [3] 0.954 [3]
99/00 Great Western 0.895 [4] 0.902 [5]
99/00 London North Eastern 0.988 [1] 0.994 [1]
99/00 Midlands 0.884 [5] 0.737 [7]
99/00 North West 0.854 [7] 0.852 [6]
99/00 Scotland 0.970 [2] 0.970 [2]
99/00 Southern 0.881 [6] 0.923 [4]
Average 0.919 0.905
¤
Relative rankings (within each year) shown in square brackets.
¤¤
Scores based on maintenance (MAIN) and total cost (TOTC) regressions.
Table 5
Summary of SFA ef®ciency scores¤
SFA1
(MAIN)
¤¤
SFA2
(TOTC)
¤¤
95/96 East Anglia 0.948 [3] 0.946 [3]
95/96 Great Western 0.989 [1] 0.988 [1]
95/96 London North Eastern 0.861 [7] 0.872 [6]
95/96 Midlands 0.869 [6] 0.893 [5]
95/96 North West 0.908 [4] 0.949 [2]
95/96 Scotland 0.900 [5] 0.863 [7]
95/96 Southern 0.954 [2] 0.925 [4]
Average 0.918 0.919
99/00 East Anglia 0.975 [3] 0.967 [4]
99/00 Great Western 0.882 [4] 0.912 [5]
99/00 London North Eastern 0.975 [2] 0.985 [1]
99/00 Midlands 0.873 [6] 0.745 [7]
99/00 North West 0.846 [7] 0.873 [6]
99/00 Scotland 0.979 [1] 0.974 [2]
99/00 Southern 0.874 [5] 0.968 [3]
Average 0.915 0.918
Gamma value 1.000 0.956
Likelihood ratio statistic (H0: Gamma D 0) 6.501 6.503
¤
Relative rankings (within each year) shown in square brackets.
¤¤
Scores based on maintenance (MAIN) and total cost (TOTC) regressions respectively.
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Furthermore, the high gamma values34 for both models indicate that the
stochastic frontier model is not signi®cantly different from the determi-
nistic frontier (COLS) model. As a result, it is unsurprising that the SFA
results produce virtually identical rankings to those generated by the
COLS method; and that the average ef®ciency scores are also similar. We
note that Coelli and Perelman (1996) also reported extreme gamma values
(either zero or greater than 0.99) in their analysis of European railways.
5.2.3. Discussion of results
From the parametric models we are inclined to accept the deterministic
(COLS) results, based on the high gamma scores from the SFA approach
(as described above). We therefore use the COLS results to draw
conclusions about the relative ef®ciency performance of Railtrack’s
zones over the period 1995/96 to 1999/00 (but we note the similarity of
these results with their SFA counterparts).
Starting with maintenance activity, our (COLS) results show that, at a
®rm-wide level, Railtrack delivered substantial real unit cost reductions in
the early years after privatisation (the time trend coef®cient in Table 3
indicates an improvement of 7.9 per cent per annum). This calculation
takes account of quality, scale and density effects, which are captured
separately in the regression equation. These unit cost reductions compare
favourably with the savings reported by other UK privatised industries (in
the region of 5 per cent per annum); and with the gains reported for the
US Class I railroads following de-regulation in the 1980s (between 3.3 and
6.7 per cent).
In terms of relative ef®ciency, Table 4 shows that Great Western,
Southern, and North West were the most ef®cient zones in 1995/96
(COLS1). However, by 1999/00, the rankings had changed signi®cantly.
London North Eastern (LNE), Scotland, and East Anglia moved up into
the top three positions, while Great Western, Southern, and North West
fell back into 4th, 6th, and 7th positions respectively. Scotland and LNE
achieved the largest real cost reduction over the period (26 per cent), while
East Anglia improved its relative position due to strong improvements
across all measures.
It was noted in Section 2 that between 1999 and 2002 Railtrack
renegotiated and consolidated its (inherited) maintenance contracts.
Contract re-negotiation would be expected to affect costs (either positively
or negatively), and we therefore investigated the extent to which this
process may have impacted on our reported ef®ciency scores. However, we
34
De®ned as g D s2u=(s
2
u C s
2
v ): See equation (4) above.
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were unable to ®nd any systematic relationship between contract
renegotiation and changes in relative performance. Of the four zones
that saw changes to some or all of their contracts, two saw their relative
rankings improve (Scotland and Midlands), while two saw falls in their
relative positions (Great Western and Southern). Of those zones that saw
no contract renegotiation, two moved up the rank orderings (LNE and
East Anglia), while the other (North West) fell back from 3rd to 7th
position.
At the total cost level (maintenance and renewals) our results imply
®rm-wide real unit cost reductions of 6.8 per cent per annum; slightly
lower than for maintenance-only activity. In 1995/96, the three most
ef®cient zones (total costs) were Great Western, North West, and East
Anglia. By 1999/00, LNE, Scotland, and East Anglia had emerged as the
top performing zones, for maintenance activity. However, the slight
difference in the rankings of the other zones (between maintenance and
total ef®ciency scores) indicates some degree of substitution between
maintenance and renewal activity. We note that the West Coast Main Line
Project35 appears to have had a signi®cant impact on the performance of
Midlands zone in 1999/00 (ef®ciency score reduced from 0.884 in COLS1
to 0.737 in COLS2).36
In addition to the changes in relative rankings noted above, the
dispersion37 of ef®ciency scores also increased between 1995/96 and
1999/00 (for both maintenance and total cost scores). In their study of UK
and Japanese Electricity Distribution systems, Hattori, Jamasb, and
Pollitt (2002) note a similar trend, and therefore question the effectiveness
of incentive regulation in closing the ef®ciency gap among companies in
the sector. However, in that case, the widening ef®ciency gap results from
frontier ®rms increasing their lead over other companies. Our analysis
suggests that the leading zones in 1995/96 were instead overtaken by
(previously) less ef®cient zones.
5.3. Ef®ciency results (post-Hat®eld)
As noted in Section 4, the cost of maintaining and renewing Britain’s rail
network has increased sharply in the last two years. In the post-Hat®eld
environment it has been argued that a permanent increase in maintenance
35
The renewal and enhancement of Britain’s West Coast Main Line (linking London and Glasgow).
36This project included a large component of track renewals, which shows up as inef®ciency in our
analysis. However, this interpretation may be inappropriate to the extent that the renewals
programme has been accelerated to capture scope economies between renewal and upgrade work.
The project started in the ®nancial year 1998/99.
37
Measured by standard deviation.
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and renewal activity is needed to sustain the network, given the substantial
increase in passenger and freight traf®c that has occurred since
privatisation. This argument has not been fully accepted, and the 2002/
03 interim review is aimed at assessing the funding required to maintain
the network going forward. It is possible that part of the cost increase has
resulted from a number of temporary factors that are reversible over time
(see below). In this sub-section we evaluate the impact of the Hat®eld
accident (and responses to it) on absolute unit cost levels, and on the
relative positions of the zones.
5.3.1. Ef®ciency scores
The OLS estimates for the two models are shown in Table 6, based on the
log-linear functional form. As for Table 3, the signs of the coef®cients have
been changed (compared to equation (3) above) for ease of interpretation,
so that a positive coef®cient indicates a positive relationship between cost
and the other variables.
The resulting COLS ef®ciency scores are shown in Table 7, together
with the SFA scores. We note that, as for the pre-Hat®eld results, the SFA
results produce high gamma values, indicating that there is little difference
between the deterministic and stochastic models (the rankings are also
virtually identical). The discussion below is therefore based on the COLS
results. Appendix 2 shows the rank correlations between the scores
produced by the two approaches.
Table 6
OLS Input Distance Function Regressions
(log-linear; t ratios in brackets)¤
Maintenance Costs (MAIN) Total Costs (TOTC)
Input
¤¤
Coef®cient t ratio Coef®cient t ratio
Constant 2.881 6.12 1.015 1.890
TIME ¡0.059 ¡7.92 ¡0.064 ¡4.801
Hat®eld dummy 0.235 5.08 0.321 3.874
TRAC 0.782 17.92 0.803 14.109
PTMD 0.640 13.11 0.808 13.302
FTOND 0.154 3.55 0.409 9.100
DELS (ratio) 0.000 0.00 ¡0.090 ¡1.775
BRLS (ratio) ¡0.135 ¡3.55 ¡0.244 ¡5.571
Adjusted R
2
0.921 0.917
¤
Positive coef®cient indicates positive relationship.
¤¤
Arbitrary choice of dependent variable.
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5.3.2. Discussion of results
As for the OLS results presented earlier (Table 3), the regression equations
in Table 6 perform well in terms of overall ®t, and the signs and
signi®cance of the variables. However, the delays variable is not signi®cant
in either of the equations, which may re¯ect the fact that, in the short term,
reduced renewal activity can actually result in lower delays, due to reduced
need for access to the track (and vice versa, as experienced in the aftermath
of Hat®eld). The time trend coef®cient is negative and signi®cant in both
equations, re¯ecting the general unit cost reductions that occurred in the
early years after privatisation (the time trend coef®cients in Table 6 are
broadly in line with those reported in Table 3). However, the positive
coef®cient on the Hat®eld dummy variable indicates that ``Hat®eld
effects’’ have led to a sharp increase in unit costs over the last two years
(2638 and 3839 per cent respectively for maintenance and total costs). The
combined effect of the time trend and Hat®eld dummies suggests that, on
average in 2001/02, zonal unit costs remain just below their 1995/96 levels
after taking account of volume and quality effects (by 12 and 7 per cent for
maintenance and total costs respectively).
In addition to the increase in absolute unit cost levels since Hat®eld, the
relative positions of some of the zones have also changed compared to the
1999/00 results. Con®ning our discussion to the COLS results (see Section
Table 7
Summary of COLS and SFA ef®ciency scores (2001/02)¤
MAIN scores TOTC scores
COLS1 SFA1 COLS2 SFA2
01/02 East Anglia 0.808 [5] 0.813 [5] 0.820 [6] 0.832 [6]
01/02 Great Western 0.788 [7] 0.769 [7] 0.914 [2] 0.931 [4]
01/02 London North Eastern 0.967 [3] 0.962 [3] 0.912 [4] 0.947 [3]
01/02 Midlands 1.000 [1] 0.983 [1] 0.822 [5] 0.842 [5]
01/02 North West 0.830 [4] 0.841 [4] 0.760 [7] 0.796 [7]
01/02 Scotland 0.987 [2] 0.980 [2] 1.000 [1] 0.977 [1]
01/02 Southern 0.795 [6] 0.812 [6] 0.913 [3] 0.955 [2]
Average 0.882 0.880 0.877 0.897
Gamma value 1.000 0.928
Likelihood ratio statistic
(H0: Gamma D 0) 14.16 7.92
¤
Rankings shown in brackets.
38
Calculated as the exponential of the Hat®eld dummy minus one: exp (0:235) ¡ 1:
39
Calculated as the exponential of the Hat®eld dummy minus one: exp(0:321) ¡ 1:
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5.3.1), for maintenance activity, Midlands, Scotland, and LNE emerge as
the top three zones (compared to LNE, Scotland, and East Anglia in 1999/
00). Midlands moved up from 5th position in 1999/00 (see Table 4) to ®rst
position in 2001/02, and was the only zone to reduce maintenance costs
over this period, while the other zones saw increases of up to 48 per cent in
real terms. At the total cost level, the three top performing zones in 2001/
02 are shown to be Scotland, Great Western, and Southern (compared
with LNE, Scotland, and East Anglia in 1999/00).
The changes to the zonal rankings since 1999/00 suggest that different
zones have developed alternative responses to the Hat®eld accident (or
have been impacted to a greater or lesser extent).
40
Furthermore,
comparison of the maintenance and total cost rankings, before and after
Hat®eld, suggests that the relationship between maintenance and renewal
activity has also changed (the correlation between the COLS1 and COLS2
results was higher in 1999/00 than in 2001/02; see Tables 4 and 7). In
particular, we note that the relative position of LNE, the zone containing
the section of track at Hat®eld, deteriorated considerably between 1999/00
and 2001/02 (from 1st position to 3rd and 4th respectively for maintenance
and total costs).
To complete this sub-section, Table 8 shows the range of potential
ef®ciency improvements41 that less ef®cient zones might be expected to
deliver, based on replicating the practices employed by the most ef®cient
zone (derived from the scores in Table 7). Table 8 puts these potential
improvements in the range of 1 to 21 per cent for maintenance activity,
and 9 to 24 per cent for overall maintenance and renewal activity. These
Table 8
Indicative Potential Ef®ciency Gains
Maintenance costs
(%)
Total Costs
(%)
East Anglia 19 18
Great Western 21 9
London North Eastern 3 9
Midlands ± 18
North West 17 24
Scotland 1 ±
Southern 20 9
Company weighted average 13 13
40The dispersion of maintenance scores has also increased since Hat®eld; though the dispersion of the
total cost ef®ciency scores has remained virtually unchanged.
41
Radial contraction of cost and quality inputs.
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potential cost reductions translate into an overall, company-wide
ef®ciency target of around 13 per cent for both maintenance and total
costs (based on a weighted average). In particular, we note that Great
Western is the least ef®cient zone according to the maintenance cost
rankings. This result appears to be in line with the decision taken by
Network Rail to bring maintenance activities in-house on the Great
Western zone in 2003.
42
It should be noted that, in our analysis, we have treated post-Hat®eld
cost increases as a frontier shift. In other words, we assume that these cost
increases are permanent Ð resulting from new information about asset
degradation Ð and that there is no prospect of returning to the unit cost
levels recorded in earlier years. However, it is possible that part of the
increase has resulted from a number of temporary factors that are
reversible over time. Examples are capacity constraints amongst Rail-
track’s supplier base; over-reaction and inef®ciency in the response to
Hat®eld, given the lack of knowledge about asset condition; and a general
switch in focus away from ef®ciency considerations, towards simply
getting the railways working again. Further savings, over and above those
shown in Table 8, may therefore be possible over time.
5.3.3. Other factors possibly affecting 2001/02 ef®ciency scores
The above analysis has taken account of a number of factors in arriving at
ef®ciency scores. In this sub-section we consider whether the zonal
ef®ciency rankings produced by our analysis can be explained by other
operational factors: (1) track quality, measured by Level 2 Exceedences
per track mile (L2Es);
43
(2) track temporary speed restrictions per track
mile (TSRs);
44
(3) track category (where a high track category score
indicates track that is capable of handling high train speeds and/or high
tonnages);45 and (4) track asset age.
We were unable to include these factors in the ef®ciency analysis
detailed above, since a full seven-year time series was not available. As a
result, we carried out simple correlation analysis between the ef®ciency
scores generated earlier, and the values of the above variables (for 2001/02
42
But we also note that Great Western performs better at the total cost level.
43Level 2 Exceedence is a measure of the difference in the actual rail position from its ``ideal’’ position.
44
Temporary speed restrictions (TSRs) is a combined measure of the length (track miles) and duration
(time) of TSRs imposed on the network due to concerns over the quality of track.
45
Track category relates to the ability of a section of track to handle the highest train speeds and/or
tonnages (on a scale of 1A to 6). Our track category measure is calculated as the percentage of track
miles (by zone) falling into the top four categories (1A to 3 inclusive); and a high percentage
therefore indicates a high track category score.
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only). Our null hypothesis is that these four operational factors can
explain some of the ef®ciency differentials reported above. If this
hypothesis is true, we would expect high ef®ciency scores to be associated
with high L2Es (that is, low track quality); high TSRs; low track
categorisation (low linespeeds/tonnage capability); and low average asset
age (newer assets).
Although the results (shown in Table 9) cannot be regarded as
statistically valid Ð being based on only a single year’s data Ð they
provide no evidence in support of the above hypothesis.
46
In other words,
there is no evidence to suggest that the most ef®cient zones identi®ed in
our analysis have achieved their high scores at the expense of other quality
measures (L2Es or temporary speed restrictions), or as a result of
advantages in respect of asset age (newer assets), or the category of track
operated in the zone (for example low speed/tonnage lines).
To complete this sub-section, it is also of interest to examine whether
the 2001/02 ef®ciency rankings can be explained according to the
maintenance contractor (or contractors) operating in each zone. Tables
10 and 11 compare maintenance and total cost ef®ciency rankings (most
ef®cient zone listed ®rst) against maintenance contractor. However, this
information does not indicate any clear relationship between ef®ciency
measure and contractor, though analysis of ef®ciency by contractor may
be an interesting area for future research. In particular, such an analysis
would increase the number of cross-sections, since at the time of writing
there were approximately twenty maintenance contract areas within
Network Rail.
We consider that the analysis presented in this paper has analysed the
main factors that affect ef®ciency performance. In particular, we have
Table 9
Correlation between 2001/02 Ef®ciency Scores¤and Four Operational
Factors
Level 2 Exceedences
(L2Es)
Temporary Speed Restrictions
(TSRs)
Track
Category
Track
Age
Correlation coef®cients ¡0.814
¤¤
¡0.423 0.135 0.153
¤
Total cost ef®ciency scores.
¤¤
Signi®cant at the 5 per cent level.
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The only correlation that is statistically signi®cant is that between ef®ciency and L2Es, but this
coef®cient is negative, indicating that ®rms with high ef®ciency also have low L2Es.
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taken account of quality measures (delays, broken rails, track quality,
TSRs), and other potential cost drivers (track category and asset age), as
well as the standard cost and volume indicators. We have considered the
relationship between ef®ciency rankings and maintenance contractor, and
also the maintenance contract renewal process. However, we recognise
that, as with any ef®ciency study, there may be other factors affecting our
ef®ciency comparisons that have not been accounted for.
6. Conclusions
Given the dif®culties with previous attempts to benchmark Railtrack’s
ef®ciency performance, the objective of this paper was to explore the use
Table 10
Maintenance Cost Ef®ciency Rankings Versus Maintenance
Contractor¤
Zone Maintenance Contractors
Midlands SERCO; AMEY; Carillion
Scotland First Engineering
London North Eastern Jarvis
North West First Engineering; Jarvis; Carillion
East Anglia Balfour Beatty; AMEC
Southern Balfour Beatty; AMEC
Great Western AMEY; Carillion
¤
Most ef®cient zone (in 2001/02) listed ®rst (based on COLS scores: see Table 7).
Source: Data on contractor location provided by Railtrack.
Table 11
Total Cost Ef®ciency Rankings Versus Maintenance Contractor¤
Zone Maintenance Contractor(s)
Scotland First Engineering
Great Western AMEY; Carillion
Southern Balfour Beatty; AMEC
London North Eastern Jarvis
Midlands SERCO; AMEY; Carillion
East Anglia Balfour Beatty; AMEC
North West First Engineering; Jarvis; Carillion
¤
Most ef®cient zone (in 2001/02) listed ®rst (based on COLS scores: see Table 7).
Source: Data on contractor location provided by Railtrack.
Journal of Transport Economics and Policy Volume 38, Part 2
184
of internal benchmarking to inform the debate on future ef®ciency targets
for Network Rail. Our approach mirrors the yardstick competition
method adopted in other UK regulated industries. Cost, output, and
quality data were collected on a consistent basis for seven geographical
zones within Railtrack, over the seven-year period 1995/96 to 2001/02.
The results in Tables 3 and 6 show that Railtrack delivered substantial
real unit cost reductions in the early years after privatisation (between 5.9
and 7.9 per cent for maintenance activity; and 6.4 to 6.8 per cent for
overall maintenance and renewal activity). These cost reductions take
account of quality, scale, and density effects, which are captured
separately in the regression equations. However, these improvements
were largely offset by the post-Hat®eld cost increases, which resulted in
unit cost increases of 26 and 38 per cent for maintenance and overall
(maintenance and renewal) activity respectively.
In terms of relative ef®ciency, the most ef®cient zones in 2001/02 are
identi®ed as Midlands, Scotland, and LNE (maintenance only); and
Scotland, Great Western and Southern (total costs). The post-Hat®eld
environment resulted in changes to the relative rankings, compared to
1999/00, indicating differing responses to Hat®eld at the zonal level. We
note that LNE (the zone containing the section of track at Hat®eld)
remains one of the more ef®cient zones according to our analysis,
although its relative position deteriorated between 1999/00 and 2001/02.
Since the ef®ciency scores and rankings outlined in the paper take
account of volume and quality measures, and cannot be explained away by
zonal differences in other operation factors (track quality; TSRs; track
category; and asset age; see Table 9) we consider these rankings to be
robust given the available data, and the relatively small sample size.
However, we recognise that, as with any ef®ciency study, there may be
additional variables that have not been accounted for in our analysis.
The relative ef®ciency scores in 2001/02 suggest there is scope for less
ef®cient zones to make cost reductions and/or quality improvements of up
to 24 per cent if they can replicate the performance of the most ef®cient
zones (see Table 8). These potential savings at zonal level translate into an
overall company-wide (radial) ef®ciency target of 13 per cent for both
maintenance and total costs. Further savings may also be possible to the
extent that part of the post-Hat®eld cost increases are temporary, and
therefore potentially reversible in future years (although, as noted earlier,
this cost increase may re¯ect a permanent change resulting from new
information about asset degradation).
We consider that the method and results detailed in this paper
demonstrate the scope for using zonal yardstick comparisons to set future
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ef®ciency targets for Network Rail. The analysis is based on a high
quality, consistently-de®ned data set, which ®ts well with our parametric
models. Furthermore, zonal differences in scale, technology, and other
environmental factors are relatively small compared with external
benchmarking studies. Our study identi®es the most ef®cient zones and
indicates a set of ef®ciency targets for less ef®cient parts of the network.
Furthermore, these targets are calculated relative to performance levels
already being achieved elsewhere within the company. As a result, we
argue that our approach, based on internal benchmarking, provides
clearer guidance on how ef®ciency gains can be achieved in practice. We
note that the ORR and Network Rail have jointly commissioned an
additional zonal benchmarking study as part of the 2002/03 interim
review, building on the analysis outlined in the preceding sections.
Appendix 1 Data Sources and De®nitions
Data Source Comments
Maintenance costs Railtrack (Finance) All ®nancial data reconciles with
Railtrack’s Statutory Accounts.
Renewal costs Railtrack (Finance) Our renewals cost series includes track
renewals only, since this measure was
considered to be more comparable across
zones (in contrast to other renewals,
such as structures or signalling). We have
used annual track renewal costs (which are
capitalised), in place of a capital stock
series, since it was not possible to access
zonal renewal data prior to privatisation
(and net book value is not an accurate
measure of capital in this industry).
47
Track Miles Railtrack Network
Management Statements
No signi®cant changes to track miles over
the period of our analysis.
47
Our parametric models perform well using this track renewal cost series, without the need, for
example, to construct a moving average renewal cost series.
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Table 11 continued
Data Source Comments
Passenger train miles Railtrack TOPS System;
Railtrack (Performance)
Accurate data was available by train
service code (groups of services) between
1998/99 to 2001/02 (TOPS system).
Railtrack provided a mapping of train
service code onto zones for 1999/00
(based on samples of data taken from the
summer and winter timetable). Given the
stability of the relationship between train
service code and zones, the same mapping
has been used for 1999/00, 2000/01 and
2001/02. The data for the period 1995/96
to 1997/98 was constructed using TOC data
(which has a very strong correlation with
the zones in most cases), supported by
additional information from Railtrack
experts.
Passenger tonne miles Railtrack
(Regulation & Government)
The passenger tonne mile series was
constructed using Railtrack data on
average tonnage per train (by TOC).
Freight tonne miles Railtrack
(Freight)
The freight billing system data (1998/99 to
2001/02), was allocated from service group
to zones using the Railtrack zone/service
group mapping. 1995/96 to 1997/98 data
were constructed using freight data by
commodity.
Delays Railtrack
(Performance)
Includes Railtrack-caused delays only.
Broken rails Railtrack (Regulation
& Government)
Level 2 exceedences Railtrack Annual Return,
2001/02
Track TSRs Railtrack Annual Return,
2001/02
Track category Railtrack (Regulation
& Government)
Track age Railtrack (Regulation
& Government)
Track asset age is an average of the age of
rail, sleepers, and ballast.
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Appendix 2 Correlations of Ef®ciency Scores
Rank Correlation Coef®cients of Ef®ciency Scores
Pre-Hat®eld period (1995/96 to 1999/00)
COLS1 SFA1 COLS2 SFA2
COLS1 1.000
SFA1 0.959 1.000
COLS2 0.883 0.880 1.000
SFA2 0.894 0.899 0.974 1.000
Rank Correlation Coef®cients of Ef®ciency Scores
Full Seven-Year period (1995/96 to 2001/02)
COLS1 SFA1 COLS2 SFA2
COLS1 1.000
SFA1 0.970 1.000
COLS2 0.774 0.717 1.000
SFA2 0.722 0.677 0.969 1.000
References
Affuso, L., A. Angeriz, and M. G. Pollitt, (2002): ``Measuring the Ef®ciency of Britain’s
Privatised Train Operating Companies,’’ Regulation Initiative Discussion Paper Series,
Number 48, London Business School.
Afriat, S. N. (1972): ``Ef®ciency Estimation of Production Functions,’’ International
Economic Review, 13, 568±98.
Aigner, D. J. and S. F. Chu (1968): ``On Estimating the Industry Production Function,’’
American Economic Review, 58, 826±39.
Aigner, D. J., C. A. K. Lovell, and P. Schmidt, (1977): ``Formulation and Estimation of
Stochastic Frontier Production Function Models,’’ Journal of Econometrics, 6, 21±37.
Booz-Allen and Hamilton (1999): Railtrack’s Expenditure Needs 2001±2006: A Report to
the Of®ce of the Rail Regulator, London.
Booz-Allen and Hamilton (2000): Response to Railtrack’s May 2000 Cost Submission: A
Report to the Of®ce of the Rail Regulator, London.
Burns, P. and T. G. Weyman-Jones, (1998): ``Is the Gas Supply Market a Natural
Monopoly? Econometric Evidence from the British Gas Regions,’’ Energy Economics,
20, 223±32.
Caves, D. W., L. R. Christensen, and J. A. Swanson, (1980): ``Productivity in US
Railroads, 1951±1974’’, Bell Journal of Economics, 11, 166±81.
Caves, D. W., L. R. Christensen, M. W. Tretheway, and R. J. Windle, (1985): ``Network
Effects and the Measurement of Returns to Scale and Density for U.S. Railroads,’’ in
Daughety, A. F., ed., Analytical Studies in Transport Economics, Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, 97±120.
Journal of Transport Economics and Policy Volume 38, Part 2
188
Chapin, A., and S. Schmidt, (1999): ``Do Mergers Improve Ef®ciency: Evidence from
Deregulated Rail Freight,’’ Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, 33, 147±62.
Charnes, A. and W. W. Cooper, (1985): ``Preface To Topics in Data Envelopment
Analysis,’’ Annals of Operations Research, 2, 59±94.
Charnes, A., W. W. Cooper, and E. Rhodes, (1978): ``Measuring the Ef®ciency of Decision
Making Units,’’ European Journal of Operational Research, 2, 429±44.
Coelli, T., D. S. P. Rao, and G. E. Battese, (1998): An Introduction to Ef®ciency and
Productivity, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston.
Coelli, T. and S. Perelman, (1999): ``A Comparison of Parametric and Non-Parametric
Distance Functions: With Application to European Railways’’, European Journal of
Operational Research, 117, 326±39.
Cornwell, C., P. Schmidt, and R. C. Sickles, (1990): ``Production Frontiers With Cross-
Sectional and Time-Series Variation in Ef®ciency Levels,’’ Journal of Econometrics, 46,
185±200.
Europe Economics (1999): Review of Railtrack Ef®ciency: A Report for the Of®ce of the
Rail Regulator, London.
Farrell, M. J. (1957): ``The Measurement of Productive Ef®ciency,’’ Journal of the Royal
Statistical Society, series A (general), 120, 253±90.
Freeman, R. and J. Shaw (2000): All Change: British Railway Privatisation, McGraw-Hill,
London
Grif®ths, W. E., R. C. Hill, and G. G. Judge, (1993): Learning and Practicing Econometrics,
John Wiley & Sons, Inc, New York.
Greene, W. H. (1980): ``Maximum Likelihood Estimation of Econometric Frontier
Functions,’’ Journal of Econometrics, 13, 27±56.
Hattori, T., T. Jamasb, and M. G. Pollitt, (2002): ``Relative Performance of UK and
Japanese Electricity Distribution Systems 1985±1998: Lessons for Incentive Regula-
tion,’’ Department of Applied Economics Working Paper (0212), University of
Cambridge.
Horton 4 Consulting (2000): The Ef®ciency Growth Assumption for Railtrack in the 2001±06
Price Control Period: A Report for the Of®ce of the Rail Regulator, London.
Jondrow, J., C. A. K. Lovell, I. S. Materov, and P. Schmidt, (1982): ``On Estimation of
Technical Inef®ciency in the Stochastic Frontier Production Function Model,’’ Journal
of Econometrics, 19, 233±38.
Lee, Y. H. and P. Schmidt, (1990): ``A Production Frontier Model With Flexible Temporal
Variation in Technical Ef®ciency,’’ in H.O. Fried, C.A.K Lovell, and S.S. Schmidt,
eds., The Measurement of Productive Ef®ciency, Oxford University Press, New York.
L.E.K. (2000): Benchmarking of Railtrack’s Freight Charges and Costs, London.
Maddala, G. S. (1977): Econometrics, McGraw-Hill Kogakusha, Tokyo.
Meeusen, W. and J. van Den Broeck, (1977): ``Ef®ciency Estimation from Cobb-Douglas
Production Functions with Composed Error,’’ International Economic Review, 18, 435±
44.
Morrison, C. J. (1999): Cost Structure and the Measurement of Economic Performance:
Productivity, Utilization, Cost Economics and Related Performance Indicators, Kluwer
Academic Publishers, Boston.
NERA (2000): Review of Overseas Railway Ef®ciency: A Draft Final Report for the Of®ce
of the Rail Regulator, London.
Of®ce of the Rail Regulator (December 1999): The Periodic Review of Railtrack’s Access
Charges: Provisional Conclusions on Revenue Requirements, London.
Assessing the Ef®cient Cost of Sustaining Britain’s Rail Network Kennedy and Smith
189
Of®ce of the Rail Regulator (July 2000): The Periodic Review of Railtrack’s Access
Charges: Draft Conclusions, London.
Of®ce of the Rail Regulator (October 2000): The Periodic Review of Railtrack’s Access
Charges: Final Conclusions, London.
Of®ce of the Rail Regulator (June 2002): The Proposed Acquisition of Railtrack PLC by
Network Rail Limited: A Statement By The Rail Regulator and Proposed Licence
Modi®cations, London.
Of®ce of the Rail Regulator (September 2002): Network Rail: Interim Review of Access
Charges: A Statement By The Rail Regulator, London.
OFGEM (June 2003): OFGEM Changes the Regulation of Gas Distribution to Better
Protect Customers, London.
OFWAT (April 1998): Assessing the Scope for Future Improvements in Water Company
Ef®ciency: A Technical Paper, Birmingham.
Oum T. H. and C. Yu, (1994): ``Economic Ef®ciency of Railways and Implications for
Public Policy: A Comparative Study of the OECD Countries’ Railways,’’ Journal of
Transport Economics and Policy, 28, 121±38.
OXERA (2000): Establishing a Cost-Reduction Target for Railtrack Based on Top-Down
Approaches, Oxford.
Pitt, M. M. and L-F. Lee, (1981): ``The Measurement and Sources of Technical Inef®ciency
in the Indonesian Weaving Industry,’’ Journal of Development Economics, 9, 43±64.
Pollitt, M. G. (1995): Ownership and Performance in Electric Utilities: The International
Evidence on Privatization and Ef®ciency, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Pollitt, M. G. and A. S. J. Smith, (2002): ``The Restructuring and Privatisation of British
Rail: Was it really that bad?,’’ Fiscal Studies, 23, 463±502.
Productivity Commission (1999): ``An Assessment of the Performance of Australian
Railways 1990 to 1998,’’ Supplement to Inquiry Report, Progress in Rail Reform,
AusInfo, Canberra.
Railtrack (1995): Annual Report and Accounts 1994/95, London.
Richmond (1974): ``Estimating the Ef®ciency of Production’’, International Economic
Review, 15, 515±21.
Schmidt, P. and R. C. Sickles, (1984): ``Production Frontiers and Panel Data,’’ Journal of
Business & Economic Statistics, 2, 367±74.
Shleifer, A. (1985): ``A Theory of Yardstick Competition,’’ Rand Journal of Economics, 16,
319±27.
Journal of Transport Economics and Policy Volume 38, Part 2
190
